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Abstract 
The aims of this research were to examine the cognitive and physiological 
reactions associated with the disclosure of a traumatic event. Cognitive-Experiential Self­
Theory (Epstein, 1991; 1998) suggests that there are two separate modes of information 
processing. One is the rational mode that is based on logic and the other is the 
experiential mode that is based on emotions and heuristics. The way these two modes of 
processing may be related to disclosure was examined using 60 undergraduate students at 
Illinois Wesleyan University. 
Participants engaged in one of four writing conditions; a trivial topic, the 
emotions surrounding a traumatic experience, the facts surrounding a traumatic 
experience, or both the facts and emotions surrounding a traumatic experience. 
Immediately after completing the writing task, participants engaged in a modified ratio­
bias task. The ratio-bias task consisted of 56 presentations of choices the participant had 
to make. The amount of optimal choices in this task is thought to be related to the mode . 
of cognitive processing the participant is in. Following this task, participants listed the 
thoughts they were having during the modified ratio-bias task. They then ftlled out a 
demographics questionnaire and the Rational-Experiential Inventory. Continuous 
cardiovascular measures were taken during all periods of the experiment including a rest 
period prior to the writing task. 
Writing condition did not have a significant effect on autonomic activation, the 
thought-listing task, or decisions across all 56 trials of the modified ratio-bias task. 
However, writing condition did have a significant effect on the first 14 trials of the 
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modified ratio-bias task. These results should been seen as promising rather than 
definitive. 
4 Cognitive Processes Underlying Disclosure 
Examining the Cognitive and Physiological Processes 
Underlying Traumatic Disclosure 
Life can be interrupted by unexpected, negative events that range in intensity 
from a fight with a friend to the death of a loved one. These events can sometimes lead to 
negative thoughts and emotions. Extensive research by Pennebaker has shown that 
inhibiting these negative thoughts and emotions can be stressful on the body, which 
leaves it more open to illness (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988). While 
inhibiting thoughts and emotions may be harmful, research also suggests that disclosure 
of the thoughts and emotions that accompany negative experiences can be helpful, not 
only psychologically but also physiologically (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, 
Hughes, & O'Herron, 1987; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988; Wegner, 
Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990; Petrie, Booth, Pennebaker, Davison, & Thomas, 1995). For 
example, when people disclose a traumatic event it has been shown that they experience 
better immune functioning as a long-term benefit (Pennebaker et. aI, 1988; Petrie et. aI, 
1995) 
Because disclosure has been shown to be such an important factor in reducing the 
negative consequences of inhibition, it is important to understand disclosure more 
thoroughly. One way to further our understanding is to make a connection between 
disclosure and the cognitive processes that underlie it. A majority of ideas about 
disclosure describe how putting our emotional experience into language allows people to 
organize and structure their experiences (Pennebaker, 1995). Stiles (1995) suggests that 
talking about a traumatic experience promotes assimilation of the traumatic event. This 
assimilation is thought to lead to some of the benefits of disclosure. A related theory 
•
 
Cognitive Processes Underlying Disclosure 5 
(Bucci, 1995) views the link between emotions and the verbal system as the key to the 
benefits of disclosure. All of these theories focus on the emotions that surround a 
traumatic event. A cognitive model that relates not only emotions but also the facts 
involved in cognitive activities is the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) that 
suggests two separate modes of information processing (Epstein 1991; 1998). One is the 
rational mode that is based on logic (Epstein 1991). The other is the experiential mode 
that is based on emotions and heuristics (1991). The experiential and rational systems can 
work with or against one another. The present study will attempt to reveal whether 
emotional disclosure of a traumatic event promotes the experiential system of 
information processing and whether both disclosure of facts and disclosure involving a 
combination of emotions and facts promote the rational system. This was done by 
measuring optimal choices in a decision making task and physiological responses of the 
autonomic nervous system during disclosure. 
Effects ofDisclosure 
One type of research on disclosure compares participants who have disclosed a 
trauma to participants who have disclosed a trivial event. A study by Pennebaker and 
Beall (1986) illustrates the basic parameters of these types of disclosure studies. Forty-six 
undergraduate students were randomly assigned to one of 4 conditions, trauma-emotion 
(TE), trauma-fact (TF), trauma-combination (TC), and a control group (C). All 
participants were instructed to write about their assigned topic for 15 minutes a day for 4 
consecutive days. The participants in the TE condition were instructed to write about only 
the emotions surrounding a previously experienced traumatic event, being sure to avoid 
describing the facts surrounding the actual event. The participants in the TF condition 
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were instructed to write about a trauma in a narrative fashion, avoiding all discussion of 
emotions. Participants in the TC condition were told to write about both the emotions and 
the facts surrounding a traumatic experience. The C participants were told to write about 
a different trivial topic each evening. 
Following each session participants completed a survey that included their own 
opinions about the content of their essays. Participants in the TE and TC conditions told 
experimenters that they had revealed more emotions in their essays compared to 
participants in the TF and C conditions. Four months after the experiment a questionnaire 
with health related items was sent to all the participants. Participants in the TE and TC 
conditions self-reported improved health and through independent verification they were 
also found to have had fewer visits to the health care center compared to TF and C 
participants (1986). 
Short-term Effects ofDisclosure. Short-term physiological changes have been 
found to occur during disclosure and its opposite, inhibition (Pennebaker, Hughes, & 
O'Heeron, 1987; Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990). For example, Pennebaker, 
Hughes, O'Heeron (1987) asked twenty-four undergraduates to talk into a tape recorder 
about a traumatic event and about their plans for the day for six-minutes each. During 
each session skin conductance levels (SCL), systolic blood pressure (SBP), diastolic 
blood pressure (DBP), and heart rate (HR) were continuously measured. It was found that 
participants who were high disclosers, determined by four blind-to-condition judges, had 
decreased SCL during the session where they disclosed a traumatic event compared to the 
session where they discussed their plans for the day. A significant increase in SBP, DBP, 
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and HR was also found among high disclosers during the disclosure of a traumatic event 
(Pennebaker et al, 1987). 
When people actively inhibit something emotional, even if it is not traumatic, it 
has a noticeable effect on the body (Wegner et al., 1990). Trying not to think about an 
exciting thought (sex) made participants' SCL increase compared to participants who 
tried not to think about more neutral topics (dancing). These results suggest that the level 
of emotional content involved in what an individual inhibits effects physiological 
responses. 
Long-term Effects ofDisclosure. Long-term physiological changes have also been 
found to coincide with disclosure (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988; Petrie, 
Booth, Pennebaker, Davison, & Thomas, 1995). A representative study asked fifty 
subjects to write about a traumatic event or a control topic for 4 consecutive days. Six­
weeks following the study the participants in the trauma group had decreased visits to the 
health center and higher immune functioning as measured by lymphocyte response to 
phytohemagglutinin and concanavalin (Pennebaker et al, 1988). 
In a related study, Petrie et al. (1995) had forty medical students who tested 
negative for Hepatitis B write about a trivial topic or a traumatic experience for 4 
consecutive days. The day after the fourth writing session all participants were given a 
vaccination for Hepatitis B. Participants in the trauma group had more Hepatitis B 
antibodies at 4 and 6 month check-ups compared to the trivial topic group (Petrie et al, 
1995). This suggests better immune functioning by those participants who disclosed a 
trauma. 
• 
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Theories ofDisclosure 
In an attempt to decipher how these benefits can occur from disclosure, previous 
theories have been used to explain the cognitive processes that underlie disclosure (Stiles, 
1995; Pennebaker, 1995; Bucci, 1995). One of these theories is called the multiple code 
theory (Bucci, 1995). In this theory, disclosure is the link between emotions and the 
verbal system. Throughout the process of disclosure concrete descriptions tum into 
abstract narratives of a traumatic event. There are three stages of disclosure in the 
multiple code theory. In the first stage it is difficult for an individual to express their 
emotions verbally. Instead they start with sensory statements such as "I feel cold." These 
statements are in what is called the subsymbolic processing system. This system is rapid, 
creative, and has no discrete categories. The next stage of disclosure moves from the 
subsymbolic to the symbolic processing system. In this symbolic system concrete images 
and episodes that represent emotions are connected with language. Following this stage 
emotional insight is reached. In this stage emotions have been processed into language 
and new categories have been made. This helps the traumatic experience be assimilated 
and the benefits ofdisclosure begin to take place. 
While it is important that Bucci's theory focuses on integrating the emotional 
experience with language it has nothing to say about the integration of the emotions of a 
trauma with the facts surrounding the trauma. A theory that could explore how this fits 
into disclosure is Epstein's Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (1991; 1998). Epstein 
(1998) believes that every person constructs his or her own model of reality. This model 
includes two separate but occasionally interactive modes of thought, the experiential 
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mode and the rational mode. All behaviors are a product ofthe actions of these two 
systems. 
The experiential system operates automatically, rapidly, effortlessly, and 
efficiently (Epstein, 1991). It encodes reality into concrete images and is based on 
heuristics and emotions. An example of the way this system is thought to work is that 
when a person responds to an emotionally significant event, the experiential system 
automatically searches in its memory for related events and their emotional 
accompaniments. If the feelings that are recalled are positive and pleasant, they motivate 
actions and thoughts that will reproduce those feelings. Ifthe recalled feelings are 
negative and unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts that will avoid reproducing 
those feelings (Epstein, 1998). What goes on in the experiential system is experienced 
passively and preconsciously. This system is resistant to changes in the beliefs it holds. It 
is also thought to be older evolutionarily compared to the rational system. 
The rational system on the other hand is based on logic and is reason oriented 
(Epstein, 1991). It encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, and numbers. The rational 
system is experienced actively and consciously and requires the justification of evidence. 
It is a slower moving system and therefore is inefficient for dealing with trivial everyday 
events like choosing which socks to wear. 
In order to examine behavior as it relates to rational and experiential modes, 
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) have utilized the ratio-bias phenomenon. The ratio-bias 
phenomenon can be demonstrated using the ratio-bias (RB) paradigm as adapted from 
Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1989, as cited in Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). The 
original task involved asking participants to respond to a vignette where a child draws a 
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preferred cookie out of a jar with 1 preferred cookie and 19 non-preferred cookies 
compared to a jar that has 10 preferred cookies and 190 non-preferred cookies. It was 
found that participants were more likely to be suspicious that cheating had resulted in 
drawing the preferred cookie in the condition where smaller numbers represented the 
probabilities. This paradigm puts a person in a situation where their experiential and 
rational modes are in conflict with one another. 
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) believed that the results found by Miller, 
Turnbull, and McFarland (1989) could be explained by the principles ofCEST. Two 
attributes of the experiential system could explain the results, the concretive principle and 
the experiential learning principle. The concretive principle says that while in the 
experiential system, people encode information in the form of concrete representations, 
not abstract principles. Ratios are a more abstract principle than absolute numbers. Since 
in the experiential system people will pay attention to the absolute numbers and not the 
ratios, they will see the choice with the larger absolute number of preferred objects as 
having a better chance of winning. 
According to the experiential learning principle, generalizations from past 
emotionally significant experiences are incorporated into the experiential system. People 
are likely to have learned that in situations where the likelihood of an event is one out of 
any high number, it is unlikely to occur. This would cause people to choose the bowl with 
a higher absolute number over a bowl with a "lout of higher number" chance. 
In order to test their theory, Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) conducted an experiment 
with 52 undergraduates where they had them choose which bowl they wanted to pick 
from. They could pick from a small bowl with 1 red and 9 white jellybeans or they could 
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pick from a large bowl with 10 red and 90 white jellybeans. Ifparticipants drew a red 
jellybean from the bowl while it was hidden from their sight, they won a dollar. The 
results showed that 76.9% of the participants chose to draw from the large bowl. When 
the participants were asked what bowl they thought other people would choose from, 
94.2% ofparticipants said others would pick from the large bowl. When given the 
opportunity to pay a dime for having a choice between bowls, roughly half of the 
participants paid to pick from the larger bowl. Participants reported that they "knew" 
their behavior was irrational because both bowls had an equal chance ofwinning, but 
regardless of that fact, they "felt" they had a better chance when they chose from the 
large bowl (1992). 
These types of statements demonstrate the disagreement that sometimes occurs 
between the rational system that "knows" there is no difference between the bowls, and 
the experiential system that "felt" the larger bowl had a better chance. Since the 
experiential system won this battle more often than the rational mode it also provides 
support for the idea that in most situations the experiential mode is dominant. It is 
believed to be dominant because it is less effortful and in most circumstances, more 
efficient (Epstein, 1998). 
Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) devised a more severe test of the RB phenomenon. 
They continued to use the two bowls of red and white jellybeans but varied the ratio of 
red to white jellybeans in the large tray from 5-9% red. The small bowl always contained 
lout of 10 red so it always had a better chance ofwinning. The optimal choice on each 
trial would always be the small bowl. The bowls were labeled with index cards so the 
participants were well informed of the ratios and the percentages of red to white 
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jellybeans in the bowls. Seventy-nine undergraduates participated in this study and it was 
found that 82% made one or more non-optimal choices. This provides further support that 
there are two competing systems, and that the experiential system usually wins. 
Vignette studies and decision-making paradigms provide powerful tools for 
exploring cognitive processing. One important compliment to such tools that has not been 
utilized in studying the CEST is measures of the nervous system. Measuring the 
autonomic nervous system may provide an additional lens for viewing the experiential 
and rational modes of cognitive processing. 
Physiological Components ofDisclosure 
The autonomic nervous system (ANS) is divided into two parts, the 
parasympathetic nervous system (PNS) and the sympathetic nervous system (SNS). The 
SNS responds to increased demands for action in the body whereas the PNS responds to 
decreased demands (Ohman, Hamm, & Hugdahl, 2000). The classic view of the two 
branches in the ANS was formed by Walter Cannon (1915 as cited in Ohman, et al, 
2000). He believed that the two branches worked as opposing reciprocal forces and this 
maintained the energy balance of the body. Berntson, Cacciopo, and Quigley formed an 
alternative idea they termed autonomic space (1991). Based on this idea, the PNS and 
SNS can fit the classical depiction where they move in opposite directions (reciprocal 
coupling), or can deviate from the classical idea and both move in the same direction or 
one can go up or down while the other remains where it is (uncoupling). An example of 
uncoupling where SNS and PNS both increased is found in strong fear reactions where 
increasing heart rate and blood pressure showed SNS arousal and at the same emptying of 
the participant's bladder showed PNS arousal (1991). 
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Research has found that higher level thinking tasks, such as mental arithmetic 
tasks, have demonstrated an uncoupling of the SNS and PNS. Lower level thinking tasks 
have shown coupling ofthe SNS and PNS (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 
1993). It follows that an individual in the experiential mode (lower level thinking) would 
be more likely to show a reciprocal coupling of SNS and PNS whereas an individual in 
the rational mode (higher level thinking) would be more likely to show uncoupling of the 
SNS andPNS. 
Pre-ejection period (PEP) is the time between the start ofthe electrical signal to 
the ventricles initiating contraction and ejection of the blood from the left ventricle to the 
aorta (Stem, Ray, Quigley, 2001). PEP is negatively correlated with sympathetic 
influence on the heart. Respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) is an oscillation in the heart 
period due to the respiratory cycle (Stem et al., 2001). RSA is positively correlated with 
increases in the parasympathetic control of the heart. These two measurements can be 
used to show reciprocal coupling or uncoupling of the ANS. 
Previous Research on CEST and Disclosure 
In the initial test of CEST and its relation to disclo sure Setork (2001) used the 
method ofPennebaker and Beall (1986) in which 60 participants were randomly assigned 
to C, TF, TE, and TC writing conditions. After written disclosure they participated in the 
ratio-bias (RB) decision making task (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). For the first trial of 
the RB task, participants in the C condition were more likely to make an optimal choice 
on the first trial compared to the participants in the trauma conditions. Out of the 
participants in the trauma conditions, individuals in the TC condition were more likely to 
make an optimal choice (85%) compared to individuals in the TE and TF conditions 
-' 
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(41% and 40% respectively). The later trials showed no significant differences in optimal 
choices between writing conditions. 
Physiological data were also collected before and during the writing task and also 
during the decision making task. During the first minute of writing participants in the TE 
condition showed strong reciprocal coupling of the ANS whereas participants in all other 
conditions showed a weak reciprocal coupling of the ANS. These results suggest that the 
participants in the TC and C conditions were in the rational mode of thinking and that 
participants in the TE condition were in the experiential mode of thinking. Even though 
the results of the ratio-bias task suggest that the participants in the TF condition were in 
the experiential mode ofthinking, the physiological data suggests there is a difference 
between what is happening with the participants in the TF condition and the participants 
in the TE condition. 
One possible explanation for why the participants in the TF were more likely to 
make non-optimal choices in the ratio-bias task is that they were cognitively busy. Gilbert 
and Hixon (1991) found that when individuals participated in a cognitive busyness task 
after their stereotypes were activated, they were more likely to apply stereotypical 
judgements of Asian confederates. Stereotypes can be seen as mental shortcuts (Allport, 
1954). Thus, the study by Gilbert and Hixon (1991) shows that when individuals were 
under a cognitive load, they resorted to mental shortcuts. 
Other mental shortcuts might be used under cognitive load depending on the 
demands of the task at hand. Ifparticipants in the TF and TE conditions are under 
cognitive load during the RB paradigm because they have not been able to integrate both 
the facts and emotions from the trauma they have just disclosed, the mental shortcut 
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might be to rely on the concretive principle (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992) and therefore 
pay attention to absolute numbers rather than ratios. This would lead to fewer optimal 
choices in the RB paradigm. 
In addition to testing whether the basic effects of the Setork (200 1) study will 
replicate, there are two problems the current study will try to disentangle. The first 
problem is that the participant's in the TF condition had the same likelihood of making 
optimal choices in the first trial of the RB paradigm as the participants in the TE 
condition, but during the disclosure task the two conditions elicited different patterns of 
ANS control suggesting the two conditions are not identical. As mentioned above, it is 
suggested this has to do with the participants in the TF condition being cognitively busy. 
To test this a thought-listing task followed the RB task. The second problem with 
Setork's (2001) results is the outcomes of the RB paradigm were significant only in the 
first trial. I suggest this has to do with the original RB paradigm allowing participants to 
take unlimited time to make decisions. This could cause individuals to no longer be in the 
cognitive mode they were in during disclosure because too much time has passed. By 
modifying the RB paradigm and forcing participants to make quicker decisions, I attempt 
to get rid of this problem. 
Based on previous research it was hypothesized that participants in C, TC, and TF 
conditions are all in the rational mode of thinking and participants in the TE condition are 
in the experiential mode. In order to show this the writing paradigm from Pennebaker & 
Beall (1986), the ratio-bias paradigm (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994), a thought-listing task 
to measure cognitive busyness (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997), and measurements 
of the autonomic nervous system (Berntson et. al199l) will be used. 
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It was hypothesized that in the RB decision-making task the participants in the C 
condition would make more optimal choices compared to the participants in all of the 
trauma conditions. Out of the trauma conditions, participants in the TC condition were 
hypothesized to make significantly more optimal choices than participants in both TE and 
TF conditions. It was also hypothesized that there would be no significant differences 
between optimal choices made by the participants in the TE and TF conditions. In the 
thought-listing task, it was hypothesized that participants in the TF and TE conditions 
would have more thoughts related to their recently disclosed trauma compared to the 
other two conditions. Physiologically it was hypothesized that participants in the TE 
condition would show strong reciprocal coupling ofthe ANS while participants in the 
other three conditions would not. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-five undergraduates were recruited from the students enrolled in General 
Psychology 100 at Illinois Wesleyan University as an opportunity for them to earn partial 
credit. The RB task was modified after the first five participants and their data was not 
used as part ofthe analysis leaving a final sample size of sixty. 
Materials 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). This 40-item inventory was devised by 
Epstein and measures rational and experiential thinking styles. Items on the scale include 
questions such as, "I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about 
something," and "I like to rely on my intuitive impressions." Participants respond to 
statements on a 4-point scale ranging from ''Never'' to "Often". 
•
 
Cognitive Processes Underlying Disclosure 17 
Modified Ratio-bias Paradigm (RB Paradigm). Participants were presented with a 
picture on a computer screen of two rectangular trays containing different mixtures of red 
and white jellybeans. One tray consisted of either ten jellybeans, one ofwhich is red 
(10% red), or twenty jellybeans, two ofwhich are red (10% red). The other tray consisted 
of 100 jellybeans, and the number of red jellybeans will vary among trials from five, six, 
seven, eight, nine, and ten (5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, and 10% red respectively). The 
percentages and ratios of the red jellybeans in each tray were stated under the appropriate 
tray. The goal of this task is to blindly draw a red jellybean. The participants must choose 
from which tray they want to blindly pick from. 
The participants were presented with a series 0 f 56 slides, each 0 f which was 
presented for 2.5 seconds. During this time participants were asked to indicate (via 
clicking the mouse) from which tray they would prefer to draw a jellybean from if given 
the opportunity. 
After the participant completes the computer task the research assistant selected . 
three pre-selected trials for them to make real life choices from. The participants were 
then presented with a tray with a predetermined ratio of red and white jellybeans based 
on decisions they made during the computer task. They were blindfolded and told to pick 
a jellybean. If they drew a red jellybean they received a dollar. If they drew a white 
jellybean they received nothing. They did this for all three of the pre-selected trials. 
Thought -Listing Task. Participants were asked to write out a list of the thoughts 
they were experiencing during the RB paradigm (Cacioppo et al, 1997). Research 
assistants, who are blind to condition, coded these thoughts for thoughts about the 
previously disclosed trauma, thoughts about the RB paradigm, and neutral thoughts. 
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Physiological. ZCG, a non-invasive measure ofblood flow through the heart, and 
electrocardiography (ECG), a measure of the electromechanical action of the heart, was 
obtained using a Minnesota Impedance Cardiograph (model304B) employing the 
standard tetra polar aluminum/mylar tape electrode system. The electrodes were adhesive 
bands that encircled the body. The second band was be placed at the base of the neck; the 
frrst band was placed at least 3 cm above the second band; the third band was placed at 
the level of the xiphistemaljunction (or just below the bra line for female participants); 
the fourth band was placed 3 cm below the third band. The front and back distances 
between the inner edges of the second and third bands were recorded. The impedance 
signals ofprimary interest were Zo, a measure of basal thoracic impedance, and dZ/dt, a 
measure of changes in thoracic impedance. ECG was recorded using standard lead II 
configuration with Ag/AgCl disposable electrodes (protrace 9113). 
Blood pressure, a measure ofpressure within the arteries was obtained from a 
Colin Model 7000 continuous, non-invasive blood pressure monitor. It used a self­
inflating blood pressure cuff along with a tonometric sensor that was placed against the 
skin and tissue above the artery in the wrist. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were informed of the general nature of 
the study and completed an informed consent form. Next, participants were hooked up to 
the sensors and the blood pressure cuff and rested for 5 minutes while physiological 
signals were checked and calibrated. Once this was done, 5 minutes of baseline data was 
recorded. 
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Next, the participants were given a pen and a notepad and were introduced to 
one of four writing topics depending on which condition they were randomly assigned to 
before they arrived. Those randomly assigned to the control condition were asked to write 
about their dorm room for 10 minutes. Those assigned to the fact-based condition were 
asked to write about a personally traumatic experience from a strictly factual perspective 
for 10 minutes, omitting any discussion of emotions. Participants in the emotion-based 
condition were asked to write about a personally traumatic experience from a strictly 
emotional perspective for 10 minutes, omitting any discussion of facts. The participants 
in the combination condition were asked to write about both the emotions and facts 
surrounding a personally traumatic experience. During this time cardiovascular measures 
were recorded. 
Next the participants completed the RB paradigm. They were read a script 
explaining how the task works and how to use the mouse. After they completed the 
computer RB paradigm, they participated in the real life RB paradigm (described above). 
For every red jellybean the participant drew they received a fake dollar bill. They were 
told this fake dollar could be exchanged for real money at the end of the study. They were 
then unhooked from the sensors and the blood pressure cuff. 
The participants completed the REI and a demographics questionnaire. After they 
are done, they were thanked, given any money they have won, and debriefed. At this time 
the participants were free to ask any questions concerning the purpose of the study. In 
addition, they were asked not to discuss the purpose ofthe study with other students. 
•
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Results 
Manipulation Checks 
To examine whether results were consistent with previous literature three 
manipulation checks were performed. First heart rate (HR) and mean arterial pressure 
(MAP) were examined. Previous research (Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) reported a 
significant increase in both HR and blood pressure from the last minute of resting to the 
frrst minute ofwriting in disclosure tasks. A within subjects analysis ofvariance 
(ANOVA) was used and significant increases in both HR, F (1,57) = 91.95, p<.OOl, and 
MAP, F (1,58) = 6.78,p<.05, were found across participants. Pennebaker and Beall 
(1987) found significantly greater increases in HR and MAP for trauma writing 
conditions compared to control conditions. However, no significant differences were 
found by writing condition in HR, F (3,53) = 1.62, p>.l, and MAP, F (3,55) = .329, 
p>.l. 
The second manipulation check was done to see if results matched with previous. 
research concerning the amount of optimal versus non-optimal choices made in the RB 
task. Pacini and Epstein (1999) found that participants make more optimal choices 
compared to non-optimal choices when performing the RB task. The results of this study 
were consistent with these findings and the participants made more optimal decisions 
(M=25.33, SD=1O.36) as compared to non-optimal decisions (M=18.67, SD=1O.36). 
The third manipulation check was to see if the scores on the REI were 
significantly related to choices on the modified RB task as previous research had found 
correlations between the REI and choices on the RB task (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). There 
are two sub scores in the REI, total rationality and total experientiality. No significant 
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correlations were found between the total rationality score on the REI and optimal 
choices in the modified RB task, r = .164, or between total experientiality score on the 
REI and optimal choices on the modified RB task, r = -.001. 
Writing condition effect on choices in the modified RB task 
To examine the effects writing condition had on optimal choices in the modified 
RB task, three a priori contrasts were tested in an ANDVA model. The first contrast 
compared the total number of optimal choices in the control writing condition to the total 
number of optimal choices in the other three trauma conditions (TE, TF, and TC). The 
second contrast compared the total number of optimal choices in the TE and TF 
conditions to the total number of optimal choices in the TC condition. The third contrast 
compared the total number of optimal choices in the TE condition to the total number of 
optimal choices in the TF condition. Results revealed no significant differences between 
groups in all 0 f the contrasts (p>.l in all contrasts). Although no significant differences 
were found among all 56 trials, the trend of optimal choices was the same as found in 
previous research (Setork, 2001) where participants in the C writing condition made the 
most optimal choices followed by the participants in the TC writing condition (see Table 
1). The participants in the TE and TF writing conditions made the fewest amount of 
optimal choices. In this study participants in the C condition made 64% optimal choices, 
participants in the TC condition made 58% optimal choices, and participants in the TE 
and TF conditions both made 54% optimal choices. 
Since in previous research (Setork, 2001) the potential effects ofwriting condition 
on choices in the RB task appeared to be short lived we decided to examine the first 14 
trials of the modified RB task. Three a priori contrasts were tested in an ANDVA model. 
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As before the first contrast compared the total number of optimal choices in the control 
writing condition to the total number of optimal choices in TE, TF, and TC combined 
(p<.05). The second contrast compared the total number of optimal choices in the TE and 
TF conditions to the total number of optimal choices in the TC condition (p>.l). The 
third contrast compared the total number of optimal choices in the TE condition to the 
total number of optimal choices in the TF condition (p>.l). Results in the first contrast 
were significant and revealed that participants in the C writing condition made more 
optimal choices in the modified RB task compared to the other three writing conditions 
(see Table 2). 
Writing condition effects on autonomic activation 
As mentioned above, autonomic space is measured by respiratory sinus 
arrhythmia (RSA) and pre-ejection period (PEP). RSA is correlated with parasympathetic 
nervous system (PNS) control of the heart. PEP is negatively correlated with sympathetic 
nervous system (SNS) control of the heart. The change between the last minute ofrest 
and the first minute ofwriting in both PEP and RSA were correlated and plotted on a 
scatter graph to examine how writing condition affected both PNS and SNS control of the 
heart. 
It was found that in comparison to previous research (Setork, 2001) the scatter 
plots were descriptively similar. In both cases there were a higher percentage of 
participants who showed reciprocal coupling of the ANS compared to those who showed 
uncoupling of the ANS across all writing conditions. Inspection of the graphs showed 
that in Setork's (2001) research for the trauma-emotion (TE) writing condition, 61 % of 
the participants showed reciprocal coupling while 0% showed uncoupling. In this study 
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for the TE writing condition, 47% ofparticipants showed reciprocal coupling while 20% 
showed uncoupling (see Figure 1). For the trauma-fact (TF) writing condition in Setork's 
(2001) research, 64% showed reciprocal coupling while 0% showed uncoupling. In this 
study, 44% showed reciprocal coupling while 29% showed uncoupling (see Figure 2). 
For the trauma-combination (TC) writing condition, Setork's (2001) results showed that 
76% ofparticipants showed reciprocal coupling while 8% showed uncoupling (see Figure 
3). In this study 64% ofparticipants showed reciprocal coupling while 14% showed 
uncoupling. For the control (C) writing condition 67% ofparticipants in Setork's (2001) 
study showed reciprocal coupling while 13% showed uncoupling. In this study 36% of 
participants in the C writing condition showed reciprocal coupling while 27% showed 
uncoupling (see Figure 4). 
Across all writing conditions, 67% ofparticipants showed reciprocal coupling 
and 5.3% ofparticipants showed uncoupling in Setork's (2001) study. In this study, 
across all writing conditions, 33.5% ofparticipants showed reciprocal coupling and 
17.5% showed uncoupling. Therefore in general, more instances of uncoupling were 
found in this study related to Setork's (2001) study. However, there did not appear to be 
any differences by writing condition. 
Thought-listing 
Two research assistants who were blind to condition coded thought-listing sheets. 
Out of 60 participants only two of them listed thoughts pertaining to the trauma or the 
writing task. Therefore it can be concluded that no significant differences existed 
between groups. 
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Discussion 
The first set ofhypotheses I had concerned the effects that writing condition 
would have on optimal choices in the RB task. I hypothesized that participants in the C, 
TF, and TC writing conditions were in the rational mode of thought and that participants 
in the TE writing condition were in the experiential mode of thought. The way this would 
be demonstrated is participants in the C writing condition would make the most optimal 
choices, participants in the TC writing condition would make the most optimal choices 
out of the three trauma conditions, and participants in the TE and TF would make the 
fewest optimal choices. For a1156 trials the results were not significant but they did 
follow the trend ofprevious research (Setork, 2001) where the participants in the C 
condition made the most optimal choices in the RB task, the participants in the TC 
condition made the most optimal choices compared to the other trauma conditions, and 
the participants in the TE and TF conditions made the fewest optimal choices. The results 
were found to be significant in the first 14 trials. These results could be examined in 
many different ways. 
One possibility for the outcome of the results is participants in the three trauma 
conditions made fewer optimal choices in the first 14 trials compared to the participants 
in the control condition because all three trauma conditions were in the experiential mode 
of thought and the participants in the control condition were not. 
Another possibility for the outcome of the results could have been that the initial 
hypothesis was correct and participants in the C, TF, and TC conditions were in different 
modes of thought processing but the modified RB task that was used did not correctly 
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measure that mode of thought. This could have occurred for 2 reasons. First, perhaps 
participants did not think the choices they were making on the computer made a real 
difference in the real RB task. Since the reward, or possibility 0 f reward, was delayed 
they might have not had the proper motivation to put effort into their decisions. The 
second reason is there might have been too much time between writing and the RB task 
because of the instructions that had to be given. This time span might have taken too long 
and caused them to fall out of the mode of thought they had been in during writing. 
A third possibility for the outcome of the results could have been that the original 
hypothesis on the different modes of thought was correct but the effects that writing 
condition had on mode of thought were short lived which would explain why the results 
were only significant for the first 14 trials. Finally, the theory that the participants were in 
different modes of thought because ofwriting condition could be wrong indicated by the 
lack of empirical support. 
The second group ofhypotheses I had concerned the physiological responses of . 
the different writing conditions. I hypothesized that participants in the TE writing 
condition would show strong reciprocal coupling of the ANS demonstrated by a strong 
correlation between PEP and RSA and the other three writing conditions would not show 
strong reciprocal coupling of the ANS demonstrated by a weak correlation between PEP 
and RSA. The outcome of the data was such that a correlational analysis was not a proper 
measure of reciprocal coupling. The reason for this is in previous research (Setork, 2001) 
participants across all writing conditions showed reciprocal coupling therefore a 
correlational analysis was used to determine the strength ofthat coupling between 
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groups. Since in the data from this study, participants showed both reciprocal coupling 
and uncoupling a correlational analysis would not have been comparable. 
For this reason an alternative way to compare the data was used. The percentage 
of the participants that were in reciprocal coupling and uncoupling quadrants of the 
graphs were compared to previous research (Setork, 2001). This analysis showed that in 
this study there were more participants who showed total uncoupling compared to 
reciprocal coupling of the ANS but across all writing conditions there were participants 
who did show uncoupling. This was inconsistent with Setork's (2001) research that 
showed very few participants who demonstrated uncoupling. As mentioned before, 
reciprocal coupling of the ANS has been previously shown to indicate lower modes of 
thought processes and therefore maybe linked to the experiential mode and uncoupling of 
the ANS has been previously shown to indicate higher modes of thought (Tomaka et al, 
1993) and maybe therefore linked to the rational mode. Because of the distribution of 
reciprocal coupling and uncoupling across all writing conditions, it appears in this study" 
participants showed physiological signs ofbeing in both the rational mode and 
experiential mode of thought during writing. This is inconsistent with previous research 
(Setork, 2001) where across writing conditions participants mostly showed physiological 
signs ofbeing in one mode or the other. 
My third hypothesis was that participants in both the TF and TE were cognitive1y 
busy because they had not been given a chance to disclose all parts of the trauma and this 
would cause them to make fewer optimal choices in the modified RB task. The results of 
the thought-listing task do not support this hypothesis. This could be because the 
instructions to the task were not clear enough and participants were not aware that they 
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could write down thoughts unrelated to the modified RB task. This could also be because 
if they had trauma related thoughts they might have not wanted to reveal them on a piece 
ofpaper that wasn't sealed in an envelope. Also it could be because the modified RB task 
lasted too long and they lost the mode ofprocessing they were in. It could also mean that 
the hypothesis was wrong and that the participants in the TF and TE writing conditions 
were not cognitively busy. 
These results give way to many future research possibilities. Other studies could 
be done on the new modified computerized RB task to see if it measures rational versus 
experiential mode the way that the real life RB task does. Participants could also be 
questioned about their motivation for the choices they made to reveal if they were really 
putting effort toward their decisions. The time between writing and modified RB task 
should try to be shortened to give the participants more of an opportunity to remain in the 
mode of thought they had been in during writing. 
Physiological research could continue to look for a way better way to sample 
physiological information while the participant is performing the writing task. Optimal 
choices in the modified RB task should be examined based on whether the participants 
demonstrated reciprocal coupling or uncoupling during the writing task to see if 
autonomic activation has an effect on optimal choices. Also it should be examined 
whether reciprocal coupling or uncoupling during the modified RB task itself effects the 
optimal choices made. The thought-listing instructions could be changed to stronger 
emphasize the ability to list thoughts unrelated to the RB task. Their thought-listing 
sheets should also be sealed in envelopes so they have fewer qualms about revealing 
personal information. 
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The trend of optimal RB choices and the significant results of the first 14 trials 
reveal that there maybe some difference between writing conditions. The physiological 
data is inconclusive. The results of the thought-listing task reveal that future research 
should continue to look for other possibilities why participants in the TC condition and C 
condition may make more optimal choices in the RB task compared to the participants in 
the TE and TF conditions. Previous research has demonstrated the many benefits of 
disclosure (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker et al, 1987, Pennebaker et al, 1988, 
Wegner et al, 1990, Pennebaker et al, 1995). The limitations and findings of this study 
will hopefully be able to aid future researchers in further examining the cognitive and 
physiological processes behind disclosure. 
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent 
We are requesting that you participate in a research study being conducted by 
Anna Carlson, an undergraduate psychology student here at Illinois Wesleyan University 
under the supervision ofDr. John Ernst. You will be asked to initial after two statements 
to ensure you have read the following paragraphs carefully. The purpose of this project is 
to better understand the cognitive and physiological processes underlying written 
disclosure. In order to do this, we are first going to ask you to write about a personal 
event for ten minutes. You may be asked to write about something traumatic or 
something not traumatic. While you write, you will be hooked up to sensors and a blood 
pressure cuff. This equipment will be used to collect your physiological responses (such 
as heart rate, blood pressure, etc.) throughout the study. 
In order to measure your heart function, two adhesive bands, like long Band-Aids, 
will be placed around your neck and two will be placed around your abdomen. This will 
require that you raise your shirt slightly so we can place the lower bands around your 
stomach. These bands will be placed on you be a female research assistant. In addition, a 
very few individuals report that the bands leave a slight reddening of the skin. Although. 
this causes no discomfort, the marks sometimes take up to 24 hours to completely fade. 
____ initials 
You may then be asked to write about a personally traumatic experience for ten 
minutes 
___~initials 
Afterwards, you will be asked to participate in a decision-making task. Lastly, 
you will be completing one survey and a brief demographics questionnaire (questions 
about your age, year in school, etc.), which will take approximately 15 minutes. The 
questions we ask you are about your thinking styles. You may find some of the questions 
to be personal or they may ask you about feelings that you are not comfortable with. You 
are free to withdraw from the session at any time and are free to answer or not answer 
any of the questions. There will be no penalty or loss of credit for withdrawing or 
omission of answers. Ifyou withdraw during the first hour ofthe experiment you will still 
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receive one research credit. If you withdraw during the second hour of the study, you will 
receive two research credits. The entire process will last about two hours. 
The specific information that you provide will be strictly confidential. Your 
questionnaire and writing samples will be identified be a random number code, and your 
name will not appear on any of these materials. All information will be held under lock 
and key. Your writing samples may be viewed only by members of the research team, 
and your identity will remain anonymous at all times. Under no circumstance will your 
writing samples or your responses to the questionnaires be matched with your name. The 
confidential responses you provide will be used by the members of the research team to 
better understand people's experiences. Summaries 0 f information you and others 
participating in the study provide may appear in research publications in psychology. 
If you have any questions regarding this project, please feel free to contact Anna 
Carlson at (309) 287-5003 or the supervising faculty member, Dr. John Ernst at (309) 
556-3907. Ifyou have any concerns regarding this project, please feel free to contact Dr. 
David Bollivar, a member ofIWU's independent review board for ethics in 
experimentation, at (309) 556-3677. 
I have read the above information pertaining to the cognitive and physiological process~s
 
underlying disclosure.
 
___ I agree to participate in this research. I understand that I may stop participation at
 
any time or not answer any ofthe questions without penalty.
 
___ I do not agree to participate in this research.
 
Participant Name (Print) 
Participant Signature Date 
Interviewer Signature Date 
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Appendix B 
Writing Instructions for Control Condition 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) 
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad ofpaper. Once I leave the room and the door 
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about your campus bedroom. 
Don't worry about grammar, spelling or sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to 
clearly describe what you bedroom looks like at school. It may be your dorm room, an 
apartment bedroom, or your bedroom in a fraternity or sorority house. Describe what 
your bedroom looks like using the most detail possible. You can describe the furniture 
you have, the colors of the room, posters on the wall, and any other descriptive features 
of your bedroom. 
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Appendix C 
Writing Instructions for Trauma-Emotion Condition 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) 
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door 
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or 
traumatic experience of your entire life. Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or 
sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to discuss your deepest feelings about the 
experience. You can write about anything you want. But whatever you choose, it should 
be about something that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should be about 
something you have not talked about with others in detail. It is critical, however, that you 
do not mention the trauma itself. Instead focus only upon your emotions. Let yourself go 
and touch the deepest emotions you have. In other words, write about how you felt at the 
time of the event and how you feel about it now. 
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Appendix D 
Writing Instructions for Trauma-Fact Condition 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) 
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door 
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or 
traumatic experience of your entire life. In your writing, I want you to discuss the details 
of the event. You can write about anything you want. But whatever you choose, it should 
be about something that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should be about 
something you have not talked about with others in detail. It is critical, however, that you 
do not mention your feelings toward the experience. Instead focus only upon the facts of 
the experience. Let your self go and retell the event as clearly as possible. In other words, 
write about what happened, where it happened, and when it happened without referring to 
any of your emotions. 
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Appendix E 
Writing Instructions for Trauma-Combination Condition 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) 
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad of paper. Once I leave the room and 
the door is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most 
upsetting or traumatic experience of your entire life. In your writing, I want you to 
discuss your deepest thoughts and feelings about the experience. You can write about 
anything you want. But whatever you choose, it should be about something that has 
affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should be about something you have not talked about 
with others in detail. It is critical, however, that you let your self go and touch the deepest 
emotions and thoughts that you have. In other words, write about what happened and how 
you felt about it, and how you feel about it now. 
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Appendix F 
Computer RB Script 
You will now be participating in a decision-making task in which you will have 
the opportunity to win and keep real money. Before the actual task begins you will have 
the chance to practice using the mouse on this particular computer. 
*When explaining the next part, show them the trays ofjellybeans... 
When the task begins, two different amounts of red and white jelly beans will 
appear on both sides of the screen. Ifpicking a red jellybean meant you would win a 
dollar and you have a chance to pick from one of the two sides without looking, which 
side would you want to pick from? You will have 5 seconds to answer this question by 
clicking on the side of the screen you would want to pick from with the mouse. When the 
task begins, there will be two sets ofnumbers at the bottom of the screen. The first set 
tells you the amount of red jellybeans to the amount of total jellybeans. The second 
number tells you the percentage ofred jellybeans on that side. 
Are there any questions so far? 
After you have completed this task, you will get to actually draw a jellybean from 
a tray with a ratio ofjellybeans based on some of the decisions you made in the previous 
task. We will place this mask over your eyes and allow you to draw one jellybean, if you 
draw a red jellybean you will receive a fake dollar that will be exchanged for real money 
at the end of the study. If you draw a white jellybean you neither win nor lose money. 
You will have 3 opportunities to draw from a tray. 
Do you have any questions? 
You can start the computer task whenever you are ready by clicking the begin button on 
the screen. 
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Appendix G 
We would like to get an idea of the thoughts that crossed your mind DURING the 
previous computer task. This page contains space for you to use to record your thoughts 
and ideas. Please write down the first thought that comes to mind on the first line (A), the 
second thought that comes to mind on the second (B), and so on. Please put one thought 
per line. You do not have to use every line. Regardless ofwhether your thoughts were 
positive, negative, neutral, or completely unrelated to the previous computer task, please 
list all of your thoughts and list them as clearly as possible. Remember, there are no 
correct answers. 
Please begin listing the thoughts that occurred to you during the previous computer task. 
A. _ 
B. _ 
C. _ 
D. _ 
E. _ 
F. _ 
G. _ 
H. _ 
1., _ 
1. _ 
K. _ 
L. _ 
M. _ 
N. _ 
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Appendix H 
REI 
Please circle the corresponding number as you rate the following statements about your 
feelings, beliefs, and behaviors. Work rapidly; first impressions are as good as any. 
1=definitely false 
2=mostly false 
3=undecided or equally true and false 
4=mostly true 
5=definitely true 
1.	 I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems.
 
1 234 5
 
2.	 If! were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
 
1 234 5
 
3.	 I prefer complex to simple problems.
 
123 4 5
 
4.	 I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
 
1 234 5
 
5.	 I have no problem with thinking things through clearly.
 
1 234 5
 
6.	 When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
 
1 2 345
 
7.	 Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
8.	 I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
 
123 4 5
 
9.	 I am not a very analytical thinker.
 
123 4 5
 
10. I believe in trusting my hunches.
 
123 4 5
 
11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
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I 2 3 4 5 
12. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. 
I 234 5 
13. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. 
12345 
14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
I 2 3 4 5 
15. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good 
enough for me. 
12345 
16. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as 
intuitive. 
I 234 5 
17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
12345 
18. I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
I 2 3 4 5 
19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if! can't explain how I 
know. 
I 2 3 4 5 
20. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
12345 
21. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's. 
I 234 5 
22. Reasoning things out carefully is not one ofmy strong points. 
I 2 345 
23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on my intuition. 
12345 
24. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
I 2 3 4 5 
25. I trust my initial feelings about people. 
123 4 5 
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26. I have a logical mind. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. I don't think it's a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions. 
12345 
28. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. 
123 4 5 
29. I don't have a very good sense of intuition. 
123 4 5 
30. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. 
12345 
31. I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition. 
12345 
32. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 
123 4 5 
33. Using my "gut feelings" usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my 
life.
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
34. I don't reason well under pressure. 
123 4 5 
35. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
123 4 5 
36. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. 
12345 
37. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest "gut feelings" to find an 
answer.
 
1 234 5
 
38. I am much better at figuring out things logically than most people. 
12345 
39. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. 
123 4 5 
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40. Learning new ways to think: would be very appealing to me. 
I 234 5 
Note. From "The relation of Rational and Experiential Information Processing Styles 
to Personality, Basic Beliefs, and the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon," by Rosemary Pacini 
and Seymour Epstein, 1999, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, p.976. 
Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with 
permISSIon. 
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REI Scoring Key 
Scoring: Sum ofratings (1-5) of items in a scale. Item numbers with an "r" are reversed 
scored as follows: 1=5,2=4,3=3,4=2,5=1. 
Rational Ability 
1. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 
5. I have no problem with thinking things through clearly.
 
r9. I am not a very analytical thinker.
 
14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
 
r22. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
 
26. I have a logical mind. 
30. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. 
r34. I don't reason well under pressure. 
38. I am much better at figuring out things logically than most people. 
Rational Favorability 
3. I prefer complex to simple problems.
 
r7. Thinking is not my idea ofan enjoyable activity.
 
11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.
 
r15. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is
 
good enough for me.
 
18. I enjoy intellectual challenges.
 
r24. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
 
r28. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.
 
32. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
 
r36. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.'
 
40. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.
 
Total Rationality = Sum ofRational Ability & Rational Favorability 
Experiential Ability 
r2. If! were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. 
6. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. 
10. I believe in trusting my hunches.
 
rl3. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.
 
19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I
 
know.
 
r21. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's.
 
25. I trust my initial feelings about people.
 
r29. I don't have a very good sense of intuition.
 
33. Using my "gut feelings" usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my 
life. 
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37. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest "gut feelings" to find an 
answer. 
Experiential Favorability 
r4. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 
8. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
 
r12. I think: it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
 
r16. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as
 
intuitive.
 
20. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
 
r23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on my intuition.
 
r27. I don't think: it's a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions.
 
31. I think: there are times when one should rely on one's intuition.
 
35. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
 
39. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
 
Total Experientiality = Sum Experiential Ability & Experiential Favorability 
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Appendix I 
Demographics 
1. Age (in years): _ 2. Gender: M F (Please circle one) 
3. Year in school: 1 2 3 4 5 (please circle one); 4. Major _ 
5. What is your ethnicity? (Please circle all that apply) 
a. Caucasian 
b. African-American 
c. Asian-American 
d. Asian-Indian-American 
e. Pacific Islander 
f. Asian-Indian 
g. LatinolLatina 
h. Asian 
i. Native American 
j. International Student country of origin 
k. Other 
6. What social groups do you belong to on campus? (Please circle all that apply) 
a. volunteer organization 
b. church group 
c. academic club 
d. fraternity or sorority 
d. musical group 
e. varsity sports team 
7. How often, if at all, do you engage in personal writing (whether it be in a journal/diary, 
writing poetry, writing poetry/stories outside of class, etc.) 
a. Once or more a week 
b. A couple oftimes a month 
c. A few times a year 
d. Never 
e. Other _ 
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For this study personal writing is defined as ant type ofwriting that you do because it is a 
way to reflect on your life. For this study we are not including work that you've done for 
schooling. 
I.Would you define personal writing in another way than my definition? 
yes....... l No ...... .2 
2. Ifyou would define personal writing in another way, what is your definition of 
personal writing? 
3. At some time in your life have you ever done personal writing -any type of writing 
that you do as a way to reflect upon your life? 
yes l Ifyes, answer questions # 4-7. 
No 2 Ifno, why have you NEVER done personal writing at any 
time in your life? 
4. Have you ever kept a diary or a journal? 
yes ....... l No .......2 
5. There are many reasons for personal writing. Which of these fits you. Please circle the 
number corresponding to the statement in the left side of the column. Circle all that 
apply.1
To document, explore, escape from, or reflect on extremely painful memories 
or feelings and how separate you feel from these feelings, including anger 
1 
To record daily events, hold onto writing for a lifetime, and to write innocent 
stories 
2 
To access the self - to have a place where I can think about things related to 
me 
3 
To reflect social change or injustice 4 
To provide temporary relie£lventilation of daily stress/smaller issues 5 
To tell the truth 6 
To break the isolation of feeling alone 7 
To give myself a boost 8 
To hide secret acts, feelings, and thoughts in writing 9 
To complete creative writings or free writings at school 10 
To communicate with or write about God 11 
To reflect or solve problems with friends or relationships 12 
To share thoughts/feelings/daily life with others in letters or gifts 13 
Other reasons: please list other reasons. 14 
6. Which of the above reasons is your main reason for doing personal writing? 
7. Please let us know anything else related to your personal writing. 
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Appendix J 
Verbal Debriefing 
[Note to experimenter - ifat any time youfeel like you want help-immediately call Dr. 
Ernst (556-3907 or 820-1099). Ifhe cannot be reached then call the health services at 
556-3107.] 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. Your participation will help us to 
better understand the physiological and cognitive processes behind written disclosure. I 
will be giving you a debriefmg form before you leave that will further explain what this 
study is examining. 
Right now, however, I want to specifically thank you for agreeing to write about a 
personal experience. As previously mentioned, everything you've written will remain 
confidential and anonymous. Often times ifwe write about something upsetting we may 
experience feelings of sadness, anger, or pain, or we may experience new feelings that we 
have not previously experienced. 
1. Did the writing exercise conjure up feelings for you? 
[Regardless ofwhether they say yes or no the experimenter is to move on to the next 
question.] 
2. Is there anything you would like to talk: about? 
[If the answer is yes-then the experimenter is to listen to what the participant has to say.] 
What if the participant doesn't seem hysterical: 
A. Let the participant talk:. 
B. At the end say something like, "Thanks for sharing those feelings me. Your 
participation is really appreciated and as I mentioned before, very valuable for 
understanding the repercussions of traumatic events." Go to question #3 below. 
Imagine that the subject seems upset: 
•
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Let the participant talk. At the end say something like, "You seem upset to me. 
Would you like to have a chance to talk to my supervisor, Dr. John Ernst, or 
someone at health services?" Ifthey say yes, then contact Dr. Ernst (556-3097 or 
820-1099) or health services (556-3107). Ifthey ask for Ernst and he is not 
available call health services. Ifthey don't answer the phone and the participant 
seems truly hysterical and/or suicidal (we don't anticipate suicidal ideation-indeed 
the literature suggests that disclosing a traumatic event is likely to make the 
participant feel better) then call the PATH Crisis Center @ 827-4005. Ifthey say 
no, ask them if they want a friend to come pick them up. 
3. Is there someone you can talk to about this experience if you want to do so later on? 
If they say no-then refer them to the contact numbers for Dr. Ernst and the Health 
Services Center. 
4. If at any time upon leaving should you want to talk to someone about any feelings that 
this study may have evoked, please feel free to contact Dr. Ernst, social psychologist here 
at lWU, or lWU Counseling services, located in the basement of Magill Hall. The 
numbers for both places are on the debriefing form I am about to give you. Thank you 
again for your participation. 
[After reading this debriefing form theparticipant will be asked if they have anyfurther 
questions, thankedfor their participation, and dismissed.] 
**Don't forget to give the participant their debriefing form and informed consent form 
before they leave.. 
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Appendix K 
Debriefing 
Thank you very much for your participation! The main purpose of this study was to 
examine the events surrounding written disclosure of a traumatic experience. Research conducted 
by Epstein suggests the existence of two distinct modes ofprocessing: rational and experiential. 
The rational mode ofprocessing is driven by logic and deliberative thought involving higher 
brain functioning, whereas the experiential mode of processing is driven by emotions and 
automatic heuristics involving lower brain functioning. For example, solving math problems 
would more heavily invoke the rational system, whereas painting a picture would more heavily 
rely on the experiential system. It is possible that writing about the facts surrounding a traumatic 
event invokes rational processing, whereas writing about the emotions surrounding a traumatic 
event invokes experiential processing. We will be examining this possibly by observing the 
relationship between your writing sample and the decisions you made in the jellybean task. 
In addition to self-report and behavioral measures, people's physiological responses have 
often been examined as a way to learn more about their psychological processing. Tomaka, 
Blascovich, Kelsey, and Leitten propose that events involving higher brain functioning involve 
one type of autonomic activation whereas lower brain functioning involves another. We will 
examine this hypothesis by looking at your physiological reactivity throughout the study. 
This research is valuable because it will help us better understand the cognitive and 
physiological processes that underlie disclosure. Disclosure is a central aspect in many therapies 
and every day encounters. It is our hope that our research will shed some light on the hidden 
processes that accompany emotional versus factual disclosure. 
It is very important that you do not talk about the specifics of this study with other 
students at IWU. You are doing this study with lots of students and it's important that everyone 
comes with the same information. We don't want some students and not others to know about 
specific tasks or questions. However, you can say that you participated in a study that examined 
the cognitive and physiological processes underlying disclosure. 
Ifyou have any questions in the future, please contact Dr. Ernst, Ph.D. at (309) 556-3907. 
In addition, if you would like to discuss any feelings this study may have invoked, please contact 
Dr. Ernst or the counseling services at IWU (free services): (309) 556-3052. 
Ifyou are interested in this study and would like further information, the following is 
recommended reading used in this study: 
Pacini, R, & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information 
processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 76. 972-987. 
Pennebaker, J.W. Emotion. Disclosure. & Health. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Thanks again for you participation! Your help is of great service as we explore cognitive 
and physiological processes underlying disclosure. 
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Table 1 
Mean and Standard Error of Optimal and Non-optimal Choices Made in All Trials of the 
Ratio-Bias Task by Writing Condition 
Choices in the Ratio-Bias Task 
Writing Condition Optimal Non-optimal 
Control 
M 28.20 15.80 
SE 2.70 9.09 
Trauma-Emotion 
M 23.60 20.40 
SE 2.70 11.48 
Trauma-Fact 
M 23.94 20.06 
SE 2.62 9.92 
Trauma-Combination 
M 25.71 18.29 
SE 2.80 11.29 
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Table 2 
Mean and Standard Error ofOptimal and Non-optimal Choices Made in the First 14 
Trials of the Ratio-Bias Task by Writing Condition 
Choices in the First 14 Trials 
Writing Condition Optimal Non-optimal 
Control 
M 6.13 3.87 
SE .64 2.39 
Trauma-Emotion 
M 4.67 5.20 
SE .64 2.33 
Trauma-Fact 
M 3.56 6.44 
SE .62 2.45 
Trauma-Combination 
M 4.64 5.36 
SE .66 2.71 
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Figure I 
Autonomic Space as a Function of Change in Pre-Ejection Period (PEP) and Change in 
RespiratOl)' Sinus Arrythmia (RSA) for Participants in the Trauma-Emotion Condition 
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Autonomic Space as a Function of Change in Pre-Ejection Period (PEP) and Change in 
Respiratory Sinus Anythmia (RSA) for Participants in the Trauma-Fact Condition 
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Autonomic Space as a Function of Change in Pre-Ejection Period (PEP) and Change in 
Respiratory Sinus Arrythmia (RSA) for Participants in the Trauma-Combination 
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Autonomic Space as a Function of Change in Pre-Ejection Period (PEP) and Change in 
Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA) for Participants in the Control Condition 
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